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Abstract
Addressing many environmental problems requires 
international cooperation. However, rules under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) may deter participation in 
multilateral environmental agreements. Using a partial 
identification approach, we obtain strictly negative bounds 
for non-OECD countries in the WTO era.
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highlights 
• WTO/GATT rules may limit participation in multilateral environmental agreements.
• We test this empirically while addressing self-selection and misclassification.
• To do so, we use a partial identification approach.
• WTO membership is found to inhibit MEA participation among non-OECD countries.
abstract 
Addressing many environmental problems requires international cooperation. However, rules under the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) may deter participation in multilateral environmental agreements. 




Multilateral environmental agreements 
Partial identification 
1. Introduction 
Little is known about the interaction between international 
trade agreements and domestic environmental policy. Here, we 
ask whether membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and its predecessor, the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), has a causal effect on participation in multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs).1 Understanding participation 
in MEAs is crucial as addressing many environmental problems 
∗ Correspondence to: Department of Economics, Box 0496, Southern Methodist
University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496, United States. Tel.: +1 214 768 3269; fax: +1 214 
768 1821. 
E-mail address: millimet@smu.edu (D.L. Millimet). 
1  For a more general discussion of the relationship between the WTO and 
environmental policy, see Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (2006). 
requires  international  cooperation  (Kellenberg  and  Levinson, 
2014). 
Since World War II, more than 150 countries have joined the 
GATT/WTO and numerous MEAs have been formed. Over 350 
international environmental agreements are currently in force; 
most consist of at least five countries. These time trends do 
not suggest a ‘chilling’ effect of GATT/WTO membership on MEA 
participation. Nonetheless, there are reasons to be concerned. First, 
economic theory emphasizes the need for full participation in 
MEAs to be successful, and this often requires punishments (or 
rewards) imposed through trade policies. Moreover, trade leakage 
due to nonparticipants may undermine MEA effectiveness (Barrett, 
2005). Second, some MEAs must impede trade by definition 
to achieve their objectives.2  Consequently, countries may reject 
such MEAs due to fear of violating WTO rules propagating 
nondiscriminatory trade (Rauscher, 2005). Alternatively, MEAs 
designed to be compatible with GATT/WTO rules may be less 
appealing to countries (Eckersley, 2004). 
Reasons also exist to reject the claim of a ‘chilling’ effect. First, 
Article XX of the GATT allows for measures to protect human, 
animal, or plant health (or life) as long as they do not discriminate 
in an arbitrary or unjust manner, are not a form of disguised 
protection, and are the least trade restrictive among alternatives. 
Second, if GATT/WTO membership promotes trade and economic 
growth, then the income  effect  may  induce  greater  demand 
for environmental protection. Third, GATT/WTO members may 
participate in MEAs to avail non-tariff barriers (such as labeling 
requirements). 
Thus, whether the WTO has a causal effect on participation in 
MEAs is an empirical question. However, estimation is plagued 
by two econometric challenges: self-selection into the GATT/WTO 
and misclassification of WTO membership status. While the former 
(non-membership). The probabilities are conditioned on observed 
covariates, X . We condition on OECD status and time period (pre- 
or post-WTO formation). Let M(1) ≡ M(WTO∗ = 1) and M(0) ≡ 
M(WTO∗ = 0) denote potential outcomes.
Estimation  of  (1)  is  complicated  due  to  (i)  the  missing 
counterfactual problem (i.e., M(1) is not observed if WTO∗ = 0 and
vice versa), and (ii) the misclassification problem (i.e., observed 
membership, denoted by WTO, may differ from WTO∗). Bounds
on ∆X are derived under different assumptions concerning the 
selection process and the extent and type of misclassification.5 
In terms of selection, we consider three assumptions: 
(S1)  Exogenous Selection (ES): 
M(0), M(1) ⊥ WTO∗|X ∈ Ω
where Ω denotes a particular set of values of X . 
(S2)  Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS): 
P [M(1) = 1|WTO∗ = 1, X ∈ Ω] 
∗ 
is straightforward, the latter is not. Interestingly, the literature ≥ P [M(1) = 1|WTO = 0, X ∈ Ω] 
on GATT/WTO membership has highlighted concerns over de 
jure versus de facto accession into the WTO (Tomz et al., 2007). 
Since misclassification of a binary treatment induces nonclassical 
measurement error, this is not a trivial issue (Black et al., 2000). 
To proceed, we utilize a nonparametric partial identification 
method – utilized in Kreider et al. (2012) and explained fully 
in McCarthy et al. (2015) – that accounts for both difficulties. 
It provides sharp bounds on the average treatment effect (ATE) 
when GATT/WTO membership is non-random and potentially 
misclassified. The bounds reveal exactly what can be learned under 
different assumptions concerning selection into treatment and the 
extent of misclassification.3 
Utilizing data on GATT/WTO membership and participation in 
MEAs for roughly 200 countries over 42 years, our results are 
striking. First, for both OECD and non-OECD countries, we obtain 
positive associations between GATT/WTO membership and MEA 
participation when failing to account for non-random selection or 
misclassification. Second, all bounds considered here that allow 
for non-random selection into the GATT/WTO contain zero for 
OECD and non-OECD countries in the pre-WTO era. Third, our 
preferred bounds that account for non-random selection into the 
GATT/WTO are strictly negative for non-OECD countries in the WTO 
period (1995–2001) in the absence of misclassification (although 
the confidence intervals do contain zero).4 This suggests that 
WTO membership may have a chilling effect on MEA participation 
by less developed countries given the demands placed on them 
for accession to the WTO (Subramanian and Wei, 2007). The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 
discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
P [M(0) = 1|WTO∗ = 1, X ∈ Ω] 
≥ P [M(0) = 1|WTO∗ = 0, X ∈ Ω]. 
(S3) Monotone Instrumental Variable (MIV): 
P [M (1) = 1|ν = u1 , X ∈ Ω]
≤ P [M(1) = 1|ν = u, X ∈ Ω] 
≤ P [M(1) = 1|ν = u2 , X ∈ Ω] 
P [M (0) = 1|ν = u1 , X ∈ Ω]
≤ P [M(0) = 1|ν = u, X ∈ Ω] 
≤ P [M(0) = 1|ν = u2 , X ∈ Ω], 
where ν is the MIV and u1 < u < u2 .
MTS assumes positive selection into treatment as the potential 
outcomes are at least as great in expectation in the treatment 
group. This is reasonable as countries often participate in MEAs and 
the WTO to signal credibility or a pro-growth stance. MIV assumes 
that potential outcomes  are  (weakly)  monotonically  increasing 
in v. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is used as the 
monotone instrument, v. However, given the literature on the 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), which suggests that economic 
growth is associated  with  lower  (higher)  environmental  quality 
at low (high) income levels, we  divide  the  sample  into  OECD 
and non-OECD countries (e.g., List et al., 2003). In the OECD 
sample, we define v as GDP per capita; we assume expected MEA 
participation is (weakly) increasing in income. For the non-OECD 
sample, we define v as minus GDP per capita; we assume expected 
MEA participation is (weakly) decreasing in income. We assess 
sensitivity to this choice. 
In terms of misclassification, we consider two assumptions: 
(M1) Upper Bound Error Rate: 
2. Methodology 
P(WTO ≠ WTO∗) ≤ Q
Our objective is to bound the ATE of GATT/WTO membership 
status on MEA participation, defined as 
∆X = P M(WTO
∗ = 1) = 1|X − P M(WTO∗ = 0) = 1|X (1)
where P [·] denotes the probability of the argument being true, M 
is a binary indicator defined such that one (zero) denotes MEA 
participation (non-participation), and WTO∗ is a binary indicator
defined such that one (zero) corresponds to true WTO membership 
3 Tamer (2010) summarizes the advantages of this approach. See also Manski
(2013). 
4 Analysis of OECD countries in the WTO period is not possible due to insufficient
variation in the data. 
(M2) No False Positives (NFP): 
WTO = 1 ⇒ WTO∗ = 1. 
Q is the maximum allowable rate of misclassification. NFP is 
reasonable as we define GATT/WTO membership based on de 
jure membership; thus, misclassification only arises if some non- 
members act as members. 
McCarthy et al. (2015) detail the derivation and estimation 
of the bounds on ∆X under different combinations of the above 
assumptions, and construction of Imbens and Manski (2004) 
confidence intervals. We omit the details here and refer the reader. 
5 Worst case bounds are also presented where the only information available
concerning the missing counterfactuals are that they lie in the unit interval. 
Table 1 
Sharp bounds on the ATE of WTO membership on MEA participation: Non-OECD, 1960–1994. 
Q Assumptions regarding selection 
Exogenous selection Worst-case MTS MTS & MIV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
I. Sign a new MEA 
0.00 [ 0.098, 0.098] p.e. 
[ 0.071, 0.126] CI 
[ −0.424, 0.576] p.e. 
[ −0.437, 0.589] CI 
[ −0.424, 0.098] p.e. 
[ −0.437, 0.121] CI 
[ −0.338, 0.025] p.e. 
[−0.365, 0.069] CI 
0.01 [ 0.089, 0.129] p.e. 
[ 0.066, 0.152] CI 
[ −0.434, 0.586] p.e. 
[ −0.447, 0.599] CI 
[ −0.434, 0.129] p.e. 
[ −0.447, 0.152] CI 
[ −0.348, 0.054] p.e. 
[ −0.375, 0.097] CI 
0.03 [ 0.071, 0.191] p.e. 
[ 0.048, 0.213] CI 
[ −0.454, 0.606] p.e. 
[ −0.467, 0.619] CI 
[ −0.454, 0.191] p.e. 
[ −0.467, 0.213] CI 
[ −0.368, 0.113] p.e. 
[ −0.395, 0.155] CI 
0.05 [ 0.053, 0.253] p.e. 
[ 0.030, 0.275] CI 
[ −0.474, 0.626] p.e. 
[ −0.487, 0.639] CI 
[ −0.474, 0.253] p.e. 
[ −0.487, 0.275] CI 
[ −0.388, 0.174] p.e. 
[ −0.415, 0.214] CI 
II. Sign, ratify, or enter in force a new MEA
0.00 [ 0.130, 0.130] p.e. 
[ 0.102, 0.158] CI 
[ −0.422, 0.578] p.e. 
[ −0.434, 0.591] CI 
[ −0.422, 0.130] p.e. 
[ −0.434, 0.154] CI 
[ −0.326, 0.022] p.e. 
[ −0.355, 0.069] CI 
0.01 [ 0.115, 0.155] p.e. 
[ 0.092, 0.179] CI 
[ −0.432, 0.588] p.e. 
[ −0.444, 0.601] CI 
[ −0.432, 0.155] p.e. 
[ −0.444, 0.179] CI 
[ −0.336, 0.046] p.e. 
[ −0.365, 0.093] CI 
0.03 [ 0.086, 0.206] p.e. 
[ 0.062, 0.230] CI 
[ −0.452, 0.608] p.e. 
[ −0.464, 0.621] CI 
[ −0.452, 0.206] p.e. 
[ −0.464, 0.230] CI 
[ −0.356, 0.094] p.e. 
[ −0.385, 0.142] CI 
0.05 [ 0.057, 0.257] p.e. 
[ 0.034, 0.281] CI 
[ −0.472, 0.628] p.e. 
[ −0.484, 0.641] CI 
[ −0.472, 0.257] p.e. 
[ −0.484, 0.281] CI 
[ −0.376, 0.143] p.e. 
[ −0.405, 0.190] CI 
Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens and Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100 
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumption of no false positives 
is imposed. MIV is minus GDP per capita. Number of observations = 4600. See text for further details. 
3. Data
Summary statistics and sources are provided in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. We focus on MEAs signed between 1960 and 2001 that 
are open (i.e., those without any participation restrictions). We 
4. Results 
In the interest of brevity, we only display the results for the 
non-OECD sample. Table 1 reports the results for the pre-WTO 
period (1960–1994). Table 2 reports the results for the post-WTO 
8 
consider only open MEAs to ensure that all countries face the same period (1995–2001). Nonetheless, we briefly describe the results 9 
pool of potential agreements in which they may participate. We 
exclude amendments to open MEAs that entered into force via tacit 
acceptance provisions (i.e., without requiring explicit ratification). 
The unit of observation is a country–year. The outcome, M, is 
a binary indicator if the country is a new participant in a MEA in 
a given year.6 A country may be counted as new participant of a 
particular MEA in a given year according to three distinct criteria: 
(i) in the year that it signs the MEA, (ii) in the year that it ratifies 
the MEA, and (iii) in the year that the MEA enters into force. How- 
ever, a country may also withdraw from an agreement or rejoin a 
MEA (Mitchell, 2013). Accordingly, M is defined in two ways. First, 
M = 1 if the country signs at least one MEA in a given year on which
obtained for the OECD sample as well. 
We obtain several salient findings. First, for both OECD and non- 
OECD countries, GATT/WTO membership is positively associated 
with MEA participation under the assumptions of exogenous 
selection and no misclassification. For non-OECD countries, this 
continues to hold in most cases even if 5% of the control group 
are de facto GATT/WTO members. Second, bounds that allow for 
non-random selection into the GATT/WTO do not exclude zero – 
even with the imposition of MTS or MTS–MIV and the assumption 
of no misclassification – for OECD and non-OECD countries in the 
pre-WTO era. Allowing for misclassification only further widens 
the bounds. Third, the point estimates of the bounds are strictly 
negative for non-OECD countries in the WTO period (1995–2001) 
10 
it had taken no prior action. Second, M = 1 if a country participates in the absence of misclassification. Allowing for misclassification 
in a new MEA in a given year, where participation is defined as any 
of the three possibilities listed above (signature, ratification, or en- 
try into force). The treatment indicator, WTO, is based on formal 
dates of accession to the WTO. The MIV, ν, is real GDP per capita.7 
A few final comments are warranted. First, using independence 
and  dissolution  dates  of  countries,  we  restrict  the  sample  to 
only  include  countries  that  existed  between  1960  and  2001. 
Second, in cases where MEAs assign multiple dates of signature, 
ratification, or entry into force for the same country (without any 
intermediate withdrawals) the earliest dates are used. Finally, an 
open agreement is considered to remain so for the entire sample 
period (Barrett, 2003). 
6 Future research might consider additional analysis based on classes of MEAs.
While of interest, given the inherent difficulty in grouping MEAs into unique 
categories we do not pursue this here. 
7 The World Bank’s real GDP per capita data are in 2005 US dollars. Since some of
the data from other sources are in 2000 US dollars, a conversion factor based on US 
GDP values (obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis) is utilized. 
up to 5%, the point estimates of the bounds continue to exclude 
zero in Panel II of Table 2. While the confidence intervals include 
zero, this suggests that WTO membership has a chilling effect on 
MEA participation by less developed countries. Finally, the results 
are sensitive to the choice of MIV. If expected MEA participation is 
assumed to be (weakly) monotonically increasing in real GDP per 
capita for non-OECD countries, the bounds always include zero.11 
8 For the MIV bounds, the samples are divided into five GDP per capita cells. The
MIV estimator is biased in finite samples, but consistent (Manski and Pepper, 2000). 
We use Kreider and Pepper’s (2007) nonparametric finite sample bias-corrected 
MIV estimator (McCarthy et al. 2015). 
9 Table A2 in the Appendix contains the results for the non-OECD sample over
the entire sample period (1960–2001). Figs. A1–A2 plot the bounds under MTS and 
MTS–MIV for non-OECD countries for the full sample and the pre-WTO period. Figs. 
A3–A4 plot the full set of bounds for non-OECD countries in the post-WTO period. 
Results for the OECD sample are available upon request. 
10 While the exclusion of zero from the bounds occurs only under the assumption
of no misclassification in Panel I, this is more plausible in the WTO period (Tomz 
et al., 2007). 
11 See Table A3 in the Appendix.
Table 2 
Sharp bounds on the ATE of WTO membership on MEA participation: Non-OECD, 1995–2001. 
Q Assumptions regarding selection 
Exogenous selection Worst-case MTS MTS & MIV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
I. Sign a new MEA 
0.00 [ 0.165, 0.165] p.e. 
[ 0.115, 0.215] CI 
[ −0.445, 0.555] p.e. 
[ −0.466, 0.576] CI 
[ −0.445, 0.165] p.e. 
[ −0.466, 0.207] CI 
[ −0.293, −0.025] p.e. 
[ −0.361, 0.103] CI 
0.01 [ 0.149, 0.192] p.e. 
[ 0.107, 0.235] CI 
[ −0.455, 0.565] p.e. 
[ −0.476, 0.586] CI 
[ −0.455, 0.192] p.e. 
[ −0.476, 0.234] CI 
[ −0.303, 0.011] p.e. 
[ −0.371, 0.140] CI 
0.03 [ 0.115, 0.250] p.e. 
[ 0.072, 0.293] CI 
[ −0.475, 0.585] p.e. 
[ −0.496, 0.606] CI 
[ −0.475, 0.250] p.e. 
[ −0.496, 0.293] CI 
[ −0.323, 0.095] p.e. 
[ −0.391, 0.221] CI 
0.05 [ 0.080, 0.311] p.e. 
[ 0.036, 0.357] CI 
[ −0.495, 0.605] p.e. 
[ −0.516, 0.626] CI 
[ −0.495, 0.311] p.e. 
[ −0.516, 0.357] CI 
[ −0.343, 0.197] p.e. 
[ −0.411, 0.314] CI 
II. Sign, ratify, or enter in force a new MEA
0.00 [ 0.131, 0.131] p.e. 
[ 0.081, 0.181] CI 
[ −0.395, 0.605] p.e. 
[ −0.415, 0.626] CI 
[ −0.395, 0.131] p.e. 
[ −0.415, 0.173] CI 
[ −0.202, −0.113] p.e. 
[ −0.261, 0.007] CI 
0.01 [ 0.103, 0.147] p.e. 
[ 0.061, 0.189] CI 
[ −0.405, 0.615] p.e. 
[ −0.425, 0.636] CI 
[ −0.405, 0.147] p.e. 
[ −0.425, 0.189] CI 
[ −0.212, −0.094] p.e. 
[ −0.270, 0.028] CI 
0.03 [ 0.046, 0.180] p.e. 
[ 0.002, 0.224] CI 
[ −0.425, 0.635] p.e. 
[ −0.445, 0.656] CI 
[ −0.425, 0.180] p.e. 
[ −0.445, 0.224] CI 
[ −0.232, −0.053] p.e. 
[ −0.290, 0.074] CI 
0.05 [ −0.014, 0.217] p.e. 
[ −0.060, 0.262] CI 
[ −0.445, 0.655] p.e. 
[ −0.465, 0.676] CI 
[ −0.445, 0.217] p.e. 
[ −0.465, 0.262] CI 
[ −0.252, −0.006] p.e. 
[ −0.310, 0.127] CI 
Notes: p.e. = point estimates; CI = confidence interval. Imbens and Manski (2004) 95% CIs obtained using 100 
bootstrap repetitions. Q = maximum rate of misclassification of WTO status. Assumption of no false positives 
is imposed. MIV is minus GDP per capita. Number of observations = 1135. See text for further details. 
The benefit of the partial identification approach is that it 
enables one to assess precisely what is learned under alternative, 
transparent sets of assumptions. That said, we find the results in 
Table 2 compelling given the negative association between income 
and environmental quality in lesser developed countries found in 
the EKC literature. Under this assumption, the strictly negative 
point estimates of the ATE are consistent with Subramanian 
and Wei (2007, p. 152): ‘‘[D]eveloping countries that wanted 
to join the WTO after 1994 have been required to engage in 
serious trade liberalization. This sets them apart from the old 
developing members.’’ The authors (p. 172) continue: ‘‘A non- 
member country that aspires to become a member has to make 
concessions and obtain approval from every existing member 
country. As a result, it is easier to demand that these new entrants 
reduce trade barriers to a greater extent than to do the same to the 
existing members... [P]ost-Uruguay Round accessions have indeed 
been qualitatively different in the sense of extracting more trade 
liberalizing concessions from prospective entrants.’’ 
5. Conclusion 
As discussed in Horn and Mavroidis (2014, p. 147), while
WTO members ‘‘are legally bound to respect negotiated reduc- 
tions of barriers to trade,’’ many members are also party to MEAs 
‘‘that often impose rights or obligations for members to restrict 
trade.’’ Thus, the relationship between the WTO and MEAs ‘‘has 
created significant controversy, since neither... clarify the relation- 
ship between these sometimes, at least seemingly, contradictory 
undertakings.’’ However, to our knowledge, the causal effect of 
WTO membership on MEA participation has not been analyzed. 
Using a partial identification approach, we obtain strictly negative 
bounds for non-OECD countries in the WTO period (1995–2001). 
This is consistent with the stringent demands of trade liberaliza- 
tion placed on new WTO members. It also implies that global in- 
tegration may do little to facilitate cooperation on international 
environmental issues. 
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